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I

n the 1920s Florida began promoting itself as the nation's winter garden. The rise of industrial agriculture throughout the
United States led to significant questions about labor, namely-who would do the work and what would the emergent labor
system look like? This article explicitly examines the role of private agricultural employers in developing the modem farm labor
system, both historically and today, in order to illuminate labor
transitions over time. 1 Historically, agricultural workers in Florida
were seasonal, or migrant, low-wage workers living on the margins
of society with few rights or protections. Under the modem farm
labor system, those attributes persist, though many contemporary
workers are now falsely documented or undocumented predominantly Latinx labor, lacking the rights and protections associated
with citizenship due to their immigration status. 2 Like their predeErin L. Conlin earned her Ph.D. at the University of Florida and is an Assistant
Professor at Indiana University of Pennsylvania. The author wishes to thank the
archivists and staff members at the National Archives and Records Administration
in College Park, MD, the State Archives of Florida, and the University of Florida
Special and Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, Joseph F. Spillane, who thoughtfully read earlier work and helped hone arguments well beyond
his tenure as a dissertation advisor; and the research writing working group at Indiana University of Pennsylvania.
1
I use the terms agricultural producers, employers, farmers and growers interchangeably to describe those who employed fieldworkers, farmworkers, or
farm laborers.
2
At the time of publication, the term "Latinx" was gaining more widespread
usage because it allowed writers to avoid using the more gendered terms of
"Latino" and "Latina."
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cessors, however, even legal workers still generally lack basic rights
and protections due to their low incomes and generally marginalized status in society. I argue agricultural growers played a pivotal
role in developing the modern farm labor system by skillfully creating and manipulating a decades-long foreign labor importation
scheme from the Bahamas, and when that finally terminated, successfully tapping into Florida's changing demographics to cultivate
a new exploitable workforce.
A careful analysis of the Bahamian temporary labor program
in Florida, which operated from 1943 to 1966, reveals how agricultural producers successfully crafted the modern farm labor system
that dominates the state and the East Coast at large. Throughout
the twentieth century, Florida growers and their allies promoted a
series of agricultural labor systems as they responded to external
changes. Each system, however, was based on the idea that farmworkers existed outside the parameters of citizenship and the benefits associated with it; and, more often than not, when national
ideological interests conflicted with economic interests of Florida
growers, the economic interests ruled the day.
I situate this article at the intersection of scholarship on
agricultural labor, immigration, and policy development and
implementation. I add to the literature by bringing these threads
together to analyze how Florida cultivated a labor system that
allowed growers nearly complete control of the workforce. Examining labor and immigration history together reveals how the
modern farm labor system emerged. Cindy Hahamovitch's definitive works on World War II era and contemporary guestworker
programs, The Fruits of Their Labor: Atlantic Coast Farmworkers and
the Making of Migrant Poverty, 1870-1945 and No Mans Land: Jamaican Guestworkers in America and the Global History of Deportable Labor,
specifically inform and guide this analysis. 3 Hahamovitch closely
examines the role of the state in crafting these systems, and the
semi-free and unfree status of guestworkers. Like Hahamovitch,
David Griffith's American Guestworkers: Jamaicans and Mexicans in
the U.S. Labor Market details how temporary guestworker programs
operate in the United States, while also examining how these
3

Cindy Hahamovitch, The Fruits of Their Labor: Atlantic Coast Farmworkers and the
Making of Migrant Poverty, 1870-1945 (Chapel Hill: The University of North
Caro~ina Press, 1997); Hahamovitch, No Mans Land: Jamaican Guestworkers in
America and the Global History ofDeportabl,e Labor (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011).
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programs impact the United States and sending communities. 4
As Hahamovitch and Griffith note, guestworkers stepped into a
landscape shaped by labor exploitation and abuse. Jerrell Shofner
has written extensively about forced labor in Florida's turpentine
and lumber industries from the end of the Civil War through the
1940s. 5 Like Shofner, Raymond A. Mohl, Melanie Shell-Weiss, and
Roberto Suro illuminate Florida's labor landscape by considering not only the conditions for domestic workers, but also how
guestworkers and immigrants experienced and shaped the state's
labor practices. 6 Expanding the purview beyond Florida and agricultural labor, Hahamovitch, Kitty Calavita, Kelly Lytle Hernandez, and Aristide Zolberg illustrate American policy development
and implementation, often focusing on the role of the state. 7 This
article brings these various threads together by specifically examining the role Florida growers played in shaping the East Coast's
modern agricultural labor system. 8
To explain the state's labor evolution, the article focuses on
agricultural producers' influence on labor transformations from
the 1890s through the modern era. It begins with an overview of
Florida's agricultural development and the state's long history of
Bahamian labor migration. I examine how this history, combined
with a decline in convict leasing and debt peonage, coupled with
restrictive national immigration policies, forced emerging industrial agricultural producers in Florida to develop a labor system
4
5

6

7

8

David Griffith, American Guestworkers: Jamaicans and Mexicans in the U.S. Labor
Market (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006).
Jerrell H. Shofner, "The Legacy of Racial Slavery: Free Enterprise and Forced
Labor in Florida in the 1940s" Journal of Southern History 47, no. 3. (August
1981): 411-426; Shofner, "Forced Labor in the Florida Forests," journal of Forest History 25, no. 1. Uanuary 1981): 14-25; Shofner, "Postscript to the Martin
Tabert Case: Peonage as Usual in the Florida Turpentine Camps," The Florida
Historical Quarterly 60, no. 2. (October1981): 161-173.
Raymond A. Mohl, "Black Immigrants: Bahamians in Early Twentieth-Century
Miami," Florida Historical Quarterly 65, no.3 Uanuary 1987): 271-297; Melanie
Shell-Weiss, Coming to Miami: A Social History (Gainesville: University Press of
Florida, 2009); Roberto Suro, Strangers Among Us: How Latino Immigration Is
Transforming America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998).
Kitty Calavita, Inside the State: The Bracero Program, Immigration, and the INS.
(New York: Routledge, 1992); Kelly Lytle Hernandez, Migra! A History of the
U.S. Border Patrol (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010); Aristide Zolberg, A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy in the Fashioning of America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).
The workers themselves also played an immensely important role in challenging exploitative labor conditions, but their experiences are largely outside the
purview of this piece since they are more complex than can be addressed in a
few sentences.
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reminiscent of the old regime but within the legal boundaries of
a changing nation. I then show how growers and their political
allies succeeded in codifying this system during World War II with
the importation of thousands of Bahamian workers. To illustrate
the origins of the modern farm labor system, I demonstrate how
growers in the postwar period continued to exert political influence by transitioning the wartime emergency farm labor importation program into a routine, privately managed labor operation.
I conclude by explaining the Latinization of the Florida agricultural workforce, linking the rise in Latinx workers to the decline in
Bahamian temporary workers.
Developing the Nation's Winter Garden and Cultivating a
Compliant Workforce

Florida's economic viability initially came from a variety of
industries including the harvesting of marine life (fish, turtles,
sponges, etc.), building and railroad construction, tourism, and
domestic service jobs. It became a significant agricultural producer
with the rise of commercial truck farming and the state's ability to
grow "every kind of garden produce at a season of the year when
no other part of the United States is producing green vegetables." 9
Although this claim stretched the truth, it articulated the unbounded enthusiasm Florida promoters felt in the 1920s and how the
state framed itself as the nation's winter garden.
Florida dramatically increased agricultural production starting
in the 1920s. Turpentine and logging operations had long utilized
the state's natural resources, and exploited local laborers to do so.
In the 1920s, though, the sugar industry looked to the state's interior, with its black "muck" soil, as a potential Garden of Eden. Growers quickly discovered that the soil was not ,naturally well suited to
growing sugar because it required significant fertilization and it
took years to figure out the proper combinations. In the meantime,
many sugar operations went bankrupt. 10 Those that succeeded,
however, inspired citrus and truck farmers to snap up large swaths
of inland Florida. Over time, growers in the state would cultivate
over two hundred and fifty different crops. 11
9

Frank Parker Stockbridge and John Holliday Perry, Florida in the Making (Kingsport, TN: Kingsport Press, 1926), 59.
10 John A. Heitmann, "The Beginnings of Big Sugar in Florida, 1920-1945." Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 77, No. 1 (Summer 1998), 45-46.
11 Heitmann, "The Beginnings of Big Sugar in Florida," 52. Stockbridge and
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It took significant time and effort to grow crops in Florida.
Both the natural environment and existing labor practices made
the state a challenging place to farm. Many farmers failed, resulting in the rapid consolidation of vegetable truck farms under corporate ownership. Large-scale industrial farming relied heavily
on a sizeable pool of available local and migrant labor to harvest
crops during a given season. Historically, Florida employers in agricultural and forestry industries relied on the state's impoverished
black population, both free and incarcerated, to do this work. Debt
peonage and convict leasing schemes were rampant in Florida after
the Civil War, and employers in many industries, like turpentine,
logging, and agriculture, relied on their labor. 12 By the late 1910s
and early 1920s, however, convict leasing and debt peonage came
under greater scrutiny by federal officials and farmers had to find
an alternative labor scheme. World War I, increasing immigration
restriction, and the Great Migration forced a re-structuring and
re-imagining of the farm labor force. Drawing on a long history of
Bahamian migration, agricultural employers looked to the island
nation to solve its labor woes. 13
Bahamian migrants arriving in the 1890s had played a pivotal
role in developing Florida. As one South Floridian explained, "all
of our heavy laborers were Bahamian negroes." 14 In addition to providing much-needed labor, Bahamians imparted knowledge about
how to farm the land and they physically reshaped the landscape
by bringing with them the islands' trees, vegetables, and fruits that

12
13
14

Perry also provide a nice overview of Florida crop production in Florida in the
Making, pages 48, 62-71, 111-12, and 116. See also the Federal Writers' Project,
The vVPA Guide to Florida: The Federal Writers' Project Guide to 1930s Florida (New
York: Pantheon Books, 1939), 79-82, 84.
See Jerrell Shofner's extensive works on the turpentine and logging industries
for detailed analysis.
For an extensive analysis of early Bahamian/Florida interactions, see Mohl,
"Black Immigrants," 271-297.
Mohl, "Black Immigrants," 273, 282. Migrants in the 1890s were considered
the "second wave," the first being in the 1830s when Bahamians migrated
to the Florida Keys seeking employment primarily in fishing, sponging and
turtling in the 1830s. As Florida developed a variety of industries, including
lumber, turpentine, and agriculture, employers hoped to take advantage of
the influx of European immigrants traveling to America in the last half of the
nineteenth century. Their hopes were quickly dashed since most Europeans
found Florida's climate insufferable and left the region at the earliest opportunity. However, migrants from the Caribbean Basin did take advantage of the
growing demand for foreign labor and many shifted from seasonal migration
to Central American countries to the lower east coast of Florida. See Mohl,
"Black Immigrants," 272-273; Shell-Weiss, Coming to Miami, 13.
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would flourish in Florida fields. These Bahamian laborers actively
participated in circular migration, traveling back and forth seasonally. By the early twentieth century, steamships reduced the amount
of time and money needed to travel between the islands and the
United States, thus increasing the fl.ow of Bahamian migration to
Florida. 15 Many moved back and forth between the Bahamas and
Florida on a regular basis, though some became naturalized U.S.
citizens and chose to remain in Florida. Few white Floridians initially took issue with the system; they relied on the Bahamian labor
and they knew most workers would return to the islands once they
earned enough money.
Between 1900 and 1920 approximately ten to twelve thousand
Bahamians, or one-fifth of the entire population, left the islands
for Florida, the majority of which were engaged in seasonal or
"livelihood" migrations. 16 These able-bodied individuals (often
men) arrived in such large numbers that news reports described
them appearing like waves rushing the shore. Eyewitnesses said
vessels traveling from the islands to Florida were so packed with
people there was barely standing room on the decks. 17 The largescale movement of workers, built upon older patterns of temporary labor migrations between Florida and the Bahamas, provided
critical support for burgeoning agricultural production. This circular migration continued well into World War I, and only began to
decline with more stringent immigration restriction. 18
Reduced European migration during World War I fundamentally altered U.S economic and labor trends. Declining immigration and the expanding industrial economy in the North created
new, high-paying jobs in war.industries for domestic workers. The
Great Migration north of well over a million African Americans
drastically altered Southern labor dynamics. 19 Black Floridians saw
wartime employment as a way to escape their current situation,
even though employers working with state· and federal legislators
tried to keep them in their place. Some workers found the North
15
16

17
18
19

Mohl, "Black Immigrants," 279.
Ibid., 273, 275-277, 279. Mohl introduced the term "livelihood migration" to
describe complex patterns of temporary Caribbean migration that were firmly established by the early decades of the twentieth century, which allowed
impoverished families and communities to survive.
Nassau Tribune, December 2, 1911, quoted in Howard Johnson, "Bahamian
Labor Migration to Florida in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries," lnternationalMigrationReview22, no. 1 (Spring 1988): 90, 93.
Mohl, "Black Immigrants," 282.
Hahamovitch, The Fruits of Their Labor, 80.
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was no oasis and instead opted to use the East Coast migrant stream
as a way to maximize employment opportunities while still retaining roots in their southern home communities. Growers never
entirely overcame the fear, however, that this new domestic migration trend would fail them. Drawing on the long established and
equally important historical Bahamian labor scheme, farmers concluded that the most tractable (and therefore desirable) workers
under this new labor system were both mobile and foreign. Growers
eventually argued that not only were foreign workers the preferred
solution, but truly the only solution, to the state's complicated labor
needs.
Some Florida farmers, during World War I, began calling for
a formalized labor importation program that would be less susceptible to external pressures like war drafts and industrial job opportunities. The chairman of the Florida State Council for National
Defense supported growers' efforts by working with the state's
elected federal officials to waive immigration laws so that Florida
growers could import Bahamians to replace African Americans.
The labor vacuum created by World War I resulted in an uptick in
Island migration; between 1916 and 1920, Bahamian and West Indian Caribbean peoples totaled almost five percent of all immigrants
to the United States. 20 At the same time, however, anti-immigration
advocates implemented policies designed to reduce migration.
Examining the informal relationship between the Bahamas and
Florida in the wake of World War I, especially in the context of
Americans' increasing wariness of foreigners, demonstrates how
growers' emerging vision of an exploitable and deportable labor
force collided with the realities of a nation embracing restrictionist immigration laws. Restrictionists eventually won the battle over
controlling the nation's borders and passed hostile immigration
laws like the Immigration Acts of 1917, 1921, and 1924, but these
policies yielded mixed results.
Nativists hoped the new immigration legislation would eliminate black Bahamian and Caribbean migration. It did not. It
reduced access to the United States, but state and local pressures ·
mitigated the worst restrictionist efforts. Florida politicians realized
that the State's development required access to cheap labor, much
20

Mohl, "Black Immigrants," 286. Officials exempted Bahamian contract workers in 1918 and 1919 from the restrictive legislation, but the practice tapered
off with the close of the war. Once the head tax was paid, the Department of
Labor could issue importation permits. Shofner, "Florida and the Black Migration," 274.
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of which was supplied by the very people federal officials hoped to
ban from entering the country. Anticipating that restrictionist policies could produce dire economic consequences for South Florida,
Florida growers lobbied officials to create a loophole that would
exclude Bahamian/Caribbean workers from the harshest provisions of the 1917 act. 21 Growers wanted access to foreign workers,
believing the workers' economic instability would make them more
docile or deportable if necessary.
In 1921 and 1924, restrictionists passed new immigration laws,
closing many of the old loopholes and threatening to crack down
on Bahamian migration with a quota system. 22 Florida farmers,
whose business ventures were beginning to play an important role
in the state's economic development, redoubled their lobbying
efforts, leading Congress to exempt Caribbean and Latin American migrants from the quota-based system in 1921. As a result,
migration to the U.S. from Mexico and the Caribbean increased
during this period. Economic interests outweighed ideological
ones; so Bahamians continued to reshape the labor market as they
flowed in and out of the state. Nativists won victories limiting Bahamian/ Caribbean access in 1924, but migrants continued to access
the United States by using Great Britain's substantial and unfilled
quota, since Bahamians and many Caribbean peoples were subjects
of the British Empire. 23 In the case of Florida, nearly 6000 Baha-

21

22

23

Shell-Weiss, Coming to Miami, 73. If domestic labor supplies were deemed insufficient, the ninth proviso of Section 3 of the act allowed the Secretary of the
Department of Labor to grant exemptions for unskilled foreign workers to
enter the country. The proviso facilitated workers' entrance by exempting
them from literacy tests, head taxes, bonds, and the 1885 ban on contract
workers. U.S. Congress, Statutes at Large, "An Act to Regulate the Immigration
of Aliens to, and the Residence of Aliens in, the United States." 64 th Congress,
2nd Sess., Chapter 29, Section 3 (Feb. 5, 1917), 8,78. (http:/ /library.uwb.edu/
guides/usimmigration/39%20stat%20874.pdf)
The 1921 Emergency Quota Act introduced the quota system and set a numerical cap on immigration, but the drastic reduction in numbers came with the
passage of the Immigration Act ofl924 (also known as the Johnson-Reed Act).
This law aimed to maximize Western European immigration and minimize
it from regions deemed inferior (particularly Asia, Africa, and Southern and
Eastern Europe). To accomplish these goals, the legislation set a numerical cap at 150,000 with admissions apportioned according to the number of
inhabitants of each "national origin" present in the continental United States
as of 1890. This policy became known as the quota system and was scheduled
to go into effect in 1927. The act favored family reunification and immigrants
over the age of twenty-one who were skilled in agriculture, and accorded nonquota status to Latin American countries in the Western Hemisphere.
Shell-Weiss, Coming to Miami, 74.
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mians per year, or about 10.3 percent of the population, legally
migrated to the state throughout the 1920s. 24
Immigration decisions in the 1920s both shaped and reflected
American attitudes towards future immigration policy, immigrants
themselves, and what it meant to be "American." The period
reflected increased national concerns about American identity; but
those discussions were about a white American identity, and fears
that poor, undesirable migrants would undermine the racial purity
nativists' sought to cultivate. 25 U.S. Border Patrol reports reveal
they were much more concerned about interdicting illegal Jewish
and Eastern European migrants than "mostly colored farm laborers coming for seasonable employment in the truck fields in and
about Miami. "26 In places like Florida and much of the South, black
laborers were seen as a necessity, desirable or not. Local employers therefore sought to maintain their ability to enter the United
States and Border Patrol attitudes reflected those pressures. African American out-migration from the state also exacerbated labor
concerns.
The Department of Labor published rough estimates on African American movement from 1922 to 1923, noting nearly a half
million people "forsook their abodes and occupations in thirteen
southern states." 27 Georgia lost the greatest number and Florida
tied with Alabama for second with an estimated 90,000 migrants.
The percentages, however, tell a different story. While Georgia lost
the largest number of African Americans, this was only 9.9% of
their total black population. In Alabama's case, their loss of ninety thousand workers was also approximately 9.9% of the African
American population. 28 While these numbers are certainly significant, Florida lost almost three times that: the departure of 90,000
African Americans in 1923 meant that the state lost roughly 27.3%
of its population-a staggeringly large number. 29
24
25
26
27

28

29

Mohl, "Black Immigrants," 290.
Zolberg, A Nation fry Design, 245.
Mohl, "Black Immigrants," 290.
1923, Negro Migration Nears Half-Million Mark During Year, RG 174 Department of Labor, NC-58 Entry 1: General Records, 1907-1942, Chief Clerk's Files,
Box 18: 9/92-8/102-C, Folder: 8/102, Migration of Negroes North and East,
St. Louis Riots, 1917-1926. National Archives at College Park, MD. (NACP)
1923, Negro Migration Nears Half-Million Mark During Year, RG 174, NACP.
Georgia's population was approximately 1,206,365 and Alabama's was 900,652.
The population numbers used in the Department of Labor chart are from the
1920 U.S. Census.
l 923, Negro Migration Nears Half-Million Mark During Year, RG 174, NACP.
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The significant decline in unskilled domestic labor sources,
coupled with seasonal Bahamian migration, explains why state
growers and their elected officials could successfully pressure local,
state, and federal officials to mitigate the most severe restrictionist legislation targeting Bahamian/Caribbean migration. Although
demands for Bahamian labor declined in the late 1920s and early
1930s due to economic depression, patterns established in the earlier boom years facilitated employers' demand for access to foreign
labor in the 1940s and beyond.
The 1920s and 1930s were a bleak period for farmers and
farmworkers in the United States. A crisis in agricultural production began even before the start of the Great Depression. 30 It displaced thousands of domestic farmworkers; a trend that continued
throughout the 1930s. Displaced laborers followed the harvests
searching for work along migrant labor flows that had taken root
and gained strength during World War I and the postwar years. The
Great Depression cemented these paths so that today they seem
a natural part of America's agricultural landscape. An estimated
eighty percent of the transient workers Florida supported in 1934
came from outside the state. 31 Farm laborers' desperate search for
work led many to Florida's winter garden where, for a while, their
numbers obviated the need for significant foreign labor.
The short-lived New Deal Civil Works Administration (CWA)
also complicated Florida's depression-era labor regime. CWA projects sought to substitute work relief for direct cash payments. 32
Employers in labor-intensive industries, like agriculture, feared
workers would abandon their jobs in favor of CWA programs and
pressured the agency to amern;l the program so that "persons who
refused employment in private industry could not be certified for
relief work," trapping many workers in their current jobs. 33 This
steady supply of workers with no viable alternative temporarily
suspended the need for imported temporary workers. World War
II, however, disrupted the domestic labor supply again, sparking a
renewed sense of crisis.
30

31
32
33

Agricultural prices soared during World War I, but by 1920 the market rate
had fallen by thirty-three percent compared with the previous year. By July
1921, they dropped eighty-five percent. Reynold M. Wik, "Henry Ford and the
Agricultural Depression of 1920-1923." Agricultural History 29, no. 1 Qanuary,
1955): 15.
Charlton W. Tebeau, A History ofFlorida (Miami, FL: University of Miami Press,
1971), 403.
Ibid. The CWA functioned in Florida in early 1934.
Ibid.
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Creating and Managing a Temporary Foreign Labor Importation
Program

World War II upset the balance of power between farmers and
workers by providing many African Americans with the opportunity to demand better pay for agricultural work or in rare cases
to leave the fields for higher-paying industrial jobs. 34 Growers,
consequently, employed the rhetoric of labor scarcity and greater
production demands-both of which were affected by the war-to
push Congress to organize and execute a foreign labor importation program that effectively granted growers complete control
over their labor supply.
Farm owners in places like Florida struggled to control local
labor, and their failure to do so often manifested itself as complaints
of "labor shortages." As Cindy Hahamovitch notes, in Florida and
throughout much of the South, any reduction in a surplus of labor
was considered a supply shortage because it undermined growers'
ability to control and exploit workers. 35 Actual farm labor numbers
were nearly impossible to quantify-few employers kept detailed
records because Social Security and labor protection legislation
excluded farmworkers. The migratory practices of many workers
also made it challenging to track their movements in a given year. 36
Consequently, a seemingly endless debate ensued about when and
where "real" shortages existed. In the context of policy implementation, the difference did not really matter. Farm owners' perceptions became their reality, and they pressured elected officials to
legislate according to those perceptions. Florida producers sought
34

35
36

Nan Elizabeth Woodruff examines this trend among cotton workers in "Pick
or Fight: The Emergency Farm Labor Program in the Arkansas and Mississippi
Delta during World War II." Agricultural History, 64, No 2 (Spring, 1990), 76.
For a full history, see Woodruff's book, American Congo: The African American
Freedom Struggle in the Delta (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
2012.)
Hahamovitch, No Man's Land, 37.
Reflecting the challenges of tracking farmworkers, the Florida Extension Service (FES) reported in 1947 that were "no estimates of the number of migrants
who winter in Florida." For the Atlantic Coast migration, estimates ranged
from 10,000 to 40,000 over a six-year period. FES estimated the 1946 season
at approximately 35,000. 1/3/47, Letter to Margaret]. Harris, FL Supervisor
of the Ministry to Migrants; From CWE Pittman, Southeastern Area Director,
Recruitment & Placement Division of Extension Farm Labor Program, RG
33 (Extension Service), NC-117, Entry 3A, General Correspondence 1945 to
1949, Box 35: 1946-1947, Farm Labor 10-1, NM, NY to Farm Labor, MA, Folder:
Farm Labor Florida. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA)
Southeastern Region (Atlanta).
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(and secured) legal measures that would enable them to tightly
control their workers and extract the most labor possible.
Government studies concluded paying higher wages would
remedy the situation, but this was not the solution growers wanted
to hear. They preferred a labor system based on access to a large
surplus of desperate, underpaid workers. Thus, when this supply
became less reliable or available, growers advocated for importing
foreign workers. Even when offered domestic workers from other
regions of the United States, employers refused. Farmers, unenthusiastic about domestic migrant workers, firmly believed "that the
sound practical solution of the shortage of farm help in this area is
to import farm negroes from the Bahama Islands." 37
The deficits resulting from domestic workers pursuing higher wages elsewhere, and the inability of women, children, volunteers, and POWs to fulfill farmers' needs, highlights how growers
employed the language of labor scarcity to reach their goal of creating a controllable workforce. By arguing there was (or would be)
a labor shortage, they manipulated Congress in two key ways. Farmers first convinced Congress to issue draft deferments to agricultural workers to ensure a larger local supply of labor. And then, when
that local supply proved difficult to control, East Coast growers leveraged their newfound power to persuade Congress that greater
numbers of foreign laborers were essential to harvest crops needed
to fuel the war effort. 38
Following a February 1943 Miami Daily News article about Florida crops wasting in the fields,James Palmer, the Regional Administrator for the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA),
stated that, to date, attempts to alleviate labor shortages through
the Farm Security Administration (FSA) had failed. Palmer claimed
that even the War Manpower Commission conceded that imported
Bahamian labor was the only solution to this problem. 39 Within a
37
38

39

ES.274, Labor Market Report for Miami, 11/15/42, RG 183 (USES), Entry 88
Labor Market Survey Reports, Box 62 Florida, Folder: Jacksonville, Miami (2 nd
folder), NACP.
Florida agricultural producers gained significant political strength during the
Sec~nd World War due to the premium placed on food production. Lizzie
Collmgham, Taste of War: World War II and the Battl,e for Food (New York: Penguin
~ooks, 201!) and Charles D. Chamberlain, Victory at Home: Manpower and Race
in the American South during World War II (Athens: University of Georgia Press,
2003) analyzed how the war changed southern labor dynamics.
Letter from James Palmer, Regional Administrator, USDA to CW Kitchen,
Deputy Director, Food Distribution Administration, USDA, 2/13/43, RG 224
Office of Labor (OL), PI 51 Entry I-General Correspondence, Mar:July 1943,
Box 14: Farm Labor 2 thru Farm Labor 3-1, Bahamas, NACP.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol96/iss4/3

12

Conlin: 'Work ... or be deported": Florida Growers and the Emergence of a

WORIC .. OR BE DEPORTED

447

month federal officials changed course and imported over 3000
Bahamians to help with U.S. agricultural harvesting. This decision
reshaped Florida's agricultural labor regime by commencing a formal guestworker labor importation system.
In spite of the many challenges foreign labor advocates faced,
or perhaps because of them, by the mid-l 940s they had firmly
established the ideological and practical foundations of a formal
guestworker program. Rather than being something totally new
and a "break with past policy" as some scholars would suggest, the
new guestworker program was the result of ongoing modifications
to existing labor practices present since the end of the Civil War. 40
The long, hard-fought struggle resulted in the formally sanctioned
British West Indian (BWI) Temporary Labor Program of World
War II. Although technically not part of the British West Indies,
employers and U.S. government officials often included Bahamians and British Hondurans under the "BWI" label.
The United States government began importing thousands of
unskilled laborers to support the war effort by working in America's
fields. Two programs emerged, the Bracero and the Bahamian/
BWI Temporary Foreign Labor Programs. Mexican braceros were
employed in large numbers primarily in the West and Midwest, and
Bahamian/BWI laborers were typically found in Florida and along
the East Coast. 41 The federal government managed the Bahamian
program from its inception in 1943 until 1947. From 1947 to its
termination in 1966, the program operated according to contracts
negotiated between private grower associations and the Bahamian
government, rather than as government-to-government contracts
as it had during the war and immediate postwar years.
Between 1943 and 1966, Florida growers implemented a new
labor system reliant on foreign labor that granted them nearly
absolute control of the workforce. From 1943 to 1947 they had
the support of the U.S. federal government in this venture, but
from that time onward it was managed solely by private farmers
40
41

Mae M. Ngai, Impossibl,e Subjects: flkgal Aliens & {he Making of Modem America
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 137.
West Coast growers imported roughly 219,546 Mexicans temporary workers to
the United States through the Bracero Program (1942-47). The Bahamian/
BWI Program, in contrast, imported just under 70,000 (1943-47). Of these
BWI workers, 15,241 were from the Bahamas, 3,995 from Barbados, and
50,598 from Jamaica, and a negligible number from British Honduras. Wayne
D. Rasmussen, A History of the Emergency Farm Labor Supply Program, 1943-194 7,
Agricultural Monograph No. 13 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Agriculture,
Bureau of Agricultural Economics, 1951), 199.

Published by STARS, 2022

13

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 96 [2022], No. 4, Art. 3

448

FLORIDA HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

and growers associations in the United States. This new labor system was a regime premised on allowing thousands of individuals
to enter the country temporarily to work, yet completely denying
them access to citizenship and the rights associated with it. Like
most of the agricultural South, labor control was the crux of the
matter for Florida growers. 42 Farm owners, however, rarely admitted this sentiment outright. Instead, they publicly highlighted
more mundane, practical reasons why British West Indian workers
could solve their labor woes. Luther L. Chandler, a Florida grower
and vocal proponent for foreign labor in Florida, saw World War
II as an opportunity to reinvigorate and legally codify the migratory flow between the Bahamas and Florida. Chandler imagined a
system with changes that would directly benefit growers. As Cindy
Hahamovitch notes, rather than returning to "the days when Bahamian men and women came and went at will, Chandler envisioned
migrant Bahamians who could be immobilized and deported at
growers' will." 43 East Coast farmers preferred Caribbean labor: the
workers were English-speakers, the islands (especially the Bahamas) were geographically closer, and there was adequate labor
immediately available and willing to work. 44
Reasons for requesting Bahamian/BWI labor, though, were
not always benign or practical. Racism and racial stereotypes
shaped many growers' attitudes and preferences. In 1942 Chandler testified before the U.S. House of Representatives Select
Committee Investigating National Defense Migration that Bahamians were a much more reliable group of workers than African
Americans. He argued that unlike local blacks, Bahamians were
"of a lesser law breaking type." 45 L.L. Stuckey, Chairman of the
Vegetable Committee of the Florida Farm Bureau, stated in a
42

43
44

45

Nan Elizabeth Woodruff, "Pick or Fight,"76-77. Likewise, Cindy Hahamovitch
argues "What occurred in the South during World War II was less a dearth
of labor than a seismic shift in the balance of power between growers and
farm laborers," and that in areas where labor supplies declined, farmworkers
pushed for improved wages and working conditions. Hahamovitch, No Mans
Land, 23.
Hahamovitch, No Mans Land, 25.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Subcommittee on Immigration of the Committee on
the Judiciary, The West Indies (B'Wl) Temporary Alien Labor Program: 1943-1977,
95 th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1978), 3-4. Mexico refused to grant permission to enough men to fill West
Coast demands; therefore, growers were correct in stating that Mexico could
not fill East Coast demands.
U.S. House. Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration. Hearings, 12, 817.
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1942 letter to Governor Spessard Holland that Bahamian labor
was preferable to other sources because it had been used for years
in South Florida communities and Bahamians easily assimilated
into the community life of local African Americans. 46 In a December 1942 letter to Governor Holland, Chandler relayed a similar
sentiment with less ambiguous language. As U.S. citizens, some
saw Puerto Ricans as a natural fit for the program. But Chandler
argued that Bahamians were preferable to Puerto Ricans on two
grounds. First, Puerto Ricans were racially incompatible with
Florida communities. He argued that Puerto Rico was "negroid
in its racial structure very largely" but "treats itself and insists
on being recognized as white." 47 Thus, Chandler claimed that it
would be impossible to house such workers because they did not
see themselves as black, yet white Americans would not accept
them as white. To Chandler, although Puerto Ricans possessed
American citizenship, they would never be Americans because
they were not "white." Chandler then added one of the most telling reasons why growers preferred British West Indians to Puerto
Ricans: Bahamians "can be forced to work a regular work program or be deported. "48
Chandler was not the only grower hoping to capitalize on Bahamian workers' inability to leave their employers without fear of
repatriation. Numerous government and grower communications
demonstrate that labor control was one of the primary reasons why
farmers continuously requested foreign labor and resisted congressional attempts to appease them with Puerto Rican workers. Growers wanted a source of labor that could be deported if it did not
work according to their demands, and Puerto Ricans could not be
repatriated because they were U.S. citizens. 49
46

47
48
49

L.L. Stuckey, Chairman of the Vegetable Committee Florida Farm Bureau
Federation, to Governor Spessard Holland, 1942, RG 102, Series 406, Box 66,
Folder 2: Gov. Holland Labor Problems (con't) 1942. FDS, State Archives of
Florida. This assessment is questionable at best, since documentation from
the period notes tensions-often resulting from competition over women and
work-between Bahamian/Caribbean workers and African Americans.
L.L. Chandler, President of Gould Growers, Inc., to Governor Spessard Holland, Dec. 9, 1942, RG 102, Series 406, Box 66, Folder 2: Gov. Holland Labor
Problems (con 't) 1942. FDS, State Archives of Florida.
Ibid.
The inability of growers to deport Puerto Ricans if they caused growers trouble
is cited in numerous sources including: Rasmussen, A History of the Emergency
Farm Labor Supply Program, 1943-1947, 234; 1942 letter from L.L. Chandler to
the War Power Commission, RG 102, Series 406, Box 66, Folder 2: Gov. Holland Labor Problems (con't) 1942. FDS, State Archives of Florida; and Edwin
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In addition to fears that Puerto Rican workers could not be
repatriated at will, a report from the meeting of the State Defense
Council's Committee on Agriculture and Processing Labor found
that Puerto Ricans tended to "scatter" upon arrival. 50 The War
Manpower Commission reported, "approximately 60 percent of
the workers left their contract employment prior to expiration, 25
percent completed their contracts, and only 15 percent returned to
Puerto Rico." 51 As citizens, they could break their contract and seek
more desirable employment without fear of deportation. 52 Eventually, the Congressional Appropriations Committee also responded
to growers' concerns by rewording the legislation funding labor
importation so that eligible workers had to be foreigners rather
than citizens. 53 Consequently, the Emergency Farm Labor Supply
Program providing Puerto Rican labor ended almost as soon as it
began and Florida agricultural producers succeeded in securing a
deportable Bahamian labor force. 54
Florida growers' interests converged with those of Bahamian
officials in the years leading up to the war. In response to threats of
labor unrest at home (and following intense prodding by L.L. Chandler), the Duke of Windsor, Governor of the Bahamas, approached
the U.S. government about creating a temporary labor program. 55
By the early 1940s, the Bahamian government was seeking ways to

50

51
52

53
54

55

Maldonado, "Contract Labor and the Origins of Puerto Rican Communities
in the United States." International Migration Review, 13, no. 1, Special Issue:
Caribbean Migration to New York (Spring, 1979), 110.
10/21/43, Meeting of the State Defense Council's Committee on Agriculture
and Agricultural Processing Labor, RG 191 (FSDC), Series 419, Box 3, Folder:
USDA (1941-1944). FDS, 3; State Archives of Florida.
Maldonado, "Contract Labor and the Origins of Puerto Rican Communities in
the United States," 111.
To encourage both Puerto Rican and foreign guestworkers to return to their
home countries, the program implemented a mandatory savings plan under
which a portion of a workers' earnings were sent directly to a bank in the
Islands, and that money could not be accessed unless the worker returned
home. Hahamovitch, The Fruits of Their Labor, 178.
Maldonado, "Contract Labor and the Origins of Puerto Rican Communities in
the United States," 112.
Hahamovitch, No Mans Land, 25. Additionally, "The practice of marking a
red "X" in the passports of any workers who returned home in less than six
months, refused work, or committed a crime served as an informal blacklist."
Hahamovitch, No Mans Land, 43, see Note 64; David Greenberg, "The Contract, 'T~e Project,' and Work Experiences," in Strangers No More: Anthropological Studies of Cat Island, the Bahamas, edited by Joel S. Savishinsky (Ithaca, NY:
Ithaca College, 1978), 173.
T.L. Thompson, "Remembering 'The Contract': Recollections of Bahamians,"
The International journal of Bahamian Studies 18 (2012): 7.
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address its high unemployment rates. As a result the idea of exporting the Islands' unemployed population gained widespread support.
Overall there was minimal opposition to the Bahamian/BWI
Labor Importation Program because most growers and consumers
benefited from the presence of foreign labor. By framing the labor
debate in terms of scarcity and the need to import foreign workers,
East Coast growers secured a labor force that they were better able
to control. Foreign workers were generally pleased to participate
because it enabled them to earn money during a period characterized by widespread economic hardship throughout the Caribbean.
Concerns for those who suffered most-the thousands of poor
domestic workers who previously harvested the majority of Florida
food crops-went largely unnoticed. Lack of political representation or collective bargaining power associated with unionization
meant that the foreign labor importation program continued to
flourish even when concerns about conditions arose. 56 As non-citizens, foreign workers could not organize unions or demand rights
associated with unions because individuals seeking better wages or
conditions were labeled "troublemakers" and deported. 57
Growers and government officials found ways to extend the
temporary labor program even after the wartime "labor crisis"
ended. Originally the program was approved under Public Law
45 (and then Public Law 229 which temporarily extended the former), which expired on December 31, 1947. Its expiration, however, did not end the program; the program simply returned to
the ninth proviso of the Immigration Act of 1917, which had first
granted permission to U.S. companies to import foreign labor. 58
56

57
58

Historically agricultural workers in Florida have failed to unionize due to several factors. The migratory nature of the labor makes it difficult to establish
a reliable organized base. Further, Depression-era federal labor laws, like the
National Industrial Recovery Act in 1933 (which allowed for collective bargaining) and the 1935 National Labor Relations Act (that provided workers the right
to unionize), excluded agricultural and domestic workers. These two groups
were also excluded from the Fair Labor Standards Act ( 1938), which established
the minimum wage and set maximum working hours. These measures excluded
domestic and agricultural workers-roughly sixty-five percent of the AfricanAmerican population-as a concession to southern Democrats; it upheld white
supremacy by keeping African Americans economically unstable and dependent
on white employers. Furthermore, in 1944, Florida adopted "right-to-work" language in its constitution, which made unionization in general more difficult.
Hahamovitch, No Man's Land, 98-99.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Subcommittee on Immigration of the Committee on
the Judiciary. The West Indies (BVVT) Temporary Alien Labor Program: 1943-1977, p.
9. For a detailed analysis of the World War II era program, see Cindy Hahamovitch, The Fruits of Their Labor and David Griffith, American Guestworkers.
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At this time, the program shifted from government-to-government negotiated and executed contracts to government-to-private
employer contracts. The U.S. government terminated its formal
position as a labor contractor but allowed growers and growers'
associations to recruit, transport, and manage foreign workers. The
Department of Labor continued to require employers to show the
U.S. government they needed to import foreign labor, but as with
the wartime years, the bar was set low and growers could manipulate the system to their advantage, often by offering wages so low
Americans refused to accept the jobs.
During the war years, the Florida Fruit and Vegetable Association (FFVA) and U.S. Sugar Corporation played pivotal roles in
shaping the state's evolving farm labor regime. Both organizations
were politically powerful entities: FFVA was (and remains) a grower
association dedicated to promoting the interests of Florida fruit
and vegetable farms. The association provided a collective voice
for Florida growers, which generated significantly more political power than they could have garnered independently. American farmers had spent decades arguing access to foreign workers
would solve their labor troubles, but they envisioned a particular
kind of labor importation-an unlimited, unregulated supply of
workers they could hire and dismiss at will. Bahamian and American authorities, however, fashioned a much more regulated system. Responding to government-imposed limitations, farm owners
eventually embraced the proposed program and quietly set about
shaping it to meet their needs.
For growers, a successful farm labor importation program
required a steady flow of qualified workers. For twenty-three years,
the Bahamas provided Sunshine State growers with the seasonal
labor they demanded. However, that labor flow was not always
steady or smooth. Sometimes Bahamian government officials
encouraged the program; at other times, they expressed concern
over its impacts on the island nation and its people. Labor quality
also varied greatly within the new farm labor program. Growers
wanted skilled, efficient workers that would perform the necessary
tasks with little complaint or disagreement. For farm owners, this
meant a quality worker not only possessed the technical know-how
needed to perform a given task, but that he also accepted his role
in the South's racial hierarchy. Rarely did workers possess these
skills or act with such docility. Consequently, Florida growers and
U.S. government agents scrambled to figure out how to maximize
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worker efficiency and force laborers to conform to the type of
behavior expected of farmworkers in the region.
The U.S. government ceased actively recruiting and transporting offshore workers in 1947, when they privatized the program.59 FFVA worked with private companies to transport workers
at a round-trip rate of $28.50, including a $0.50 head tax on travel
to the United States. 6° FFVA advanced workers the money for the
arrival fare to the United States, and then deducted repayment
for the cost of the trip from their earnings once they began working. This meant that workers footed that bill as part of their arrival
transportation fees. 61 If a worker did not complete his contract, he
would have to pay his return fare, whereas if he worked through
the end of the contract FFVA paid his return fare. This payment
scheme created an additional monetary incentive to complete a
contract even if conditions were less than ideal. With privatization,
workers also had a more difficult time challenging employers who
violated their contracts.
Both the American Department of Labor and British West
Indian Central Labour Organization (BWICLO), the Bahamas/
BWI agency that had helped manage the program in the United
States, were responsible for making sure employers did not violate
worker contracts during the government-run era program. In the
wake of privatization, however, the responsibility for "evaluating
employer compliance with terms of the written contract" shifted
from the U.S. Department of Labor solely to BWICL0. 62 This shift
59

60

61
62

The end of World War II led to the concurrent abolition of the Office of Labor
and the War Food Administration in 1945. Since Congress continued to authorize the Emergency Farm Labor Program until 1947, however, many of the
OL/WFA responsibilities returned to the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
Peter Kramer describes the transition to private transportation contracting in
The Offshores. Nationwide Air Transport Service won the new transportation
contract. Eventually Nationwide merged with Resort Air and the new company
continued the work of recruiting transporting workers. Kramer, The Offshores,
26, RG 174, UD Entry 2: Records of the Secretary of Labor, W. Willard Wirtz,
1962-1969, Box 372: Farm Labor,July-December 1966, Folder: ES-2-6-1 Farm
Labor, Aug. 11-20, 1966. NACP.
Nationwide Air Transport Services took over the task from 1947-53. Then,
William H. Meranda, a former pilot for the company, created the Meranda
Company, which contracted Pan Am to transport the workers. According to
Kramer, The Offshores, 26-28, RG 174, NACP, they used Pan Am exclusively from
1956 until the program's shuttering in 1966.
Kramer, The Offshores, 27, RG 174, NACP.
7/1/59, Report by the U.S. Department of Labor for James Roosevelt. Office
Memorandum, U.S. Government; To Under Secretary, From Robert C. Goodwin; Subject: Information Concerning the Annual Worker Plan, RG 174,
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meant fewer resources were available to workers. There were fewer
administrators available to investigate claims, and they had to cover
larger geographic territories based on how dispersed workers were
throughout the East Coast at any given time. Additionally, BWICLO's primary goal was to keep the program running smoothly.
When this mandate conflicted with worker claims of contract violations, there was no guarantee that workers would seejustice. 63
At various points in time, between 1947 and 1966, when the
program was privately operated, the Department of Labor hoped
to dismantle the program arguing it undermined the welfare of
American workers. In an attempt to develop "policy and procedure
which would assure domestic workers job preference in agriculture," the Labor Department put together an Annual Worker Plan,
starting in 1949, to facilitate domestic labor flows and provide continuous employment to migrant families by finding better ways to
move workers from regions of labor surplus to those with labor
scarcities. 64 Around the time the Department of Labor developed
this plan, it also re-opened the Puerto Rican labor importation
program to encourage employment of U.S. citizens. 65 The Labor
Department evaluated the program for five years before making
it national in 1954. 66 President Dwight D. Eisenhower also tried
to make it more expensive to import workers, hoping this would
encourage growers to hire domestic workers instead. While the
U.S. government made some gains in increasing domestic employment in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Korean War temporarily

63
64

65
66

NC-58 Entry 36, Box 293, 1959 Alpha-Numeric Subject Files, ES-2-6-l-ES-2-61, Folder: Subfolder: ES-2-6-1. NACP.
Kramer, The Offshores, 88, RG 174, ·NACP.
The plan, formerly known as the Eastern Seaboard Plan, came about following the return of the Farm Placement Service from the U.S. Department of
Agriculture to the U.S. Department of Labor in 1948. The plan was conceived
ofin 1948, implemented in 1949, and evaluated for five years. 5/25/59, Office
Memorandum, U.S. Government; To Under Secretary, From Robert C. Goodwin; Subject: Information Concerning the Annual Worker Plan, RG 174,
NC-58 Entry 36, Box 293, 1959 Alpha-Numeric Subject Files, ES-2-6-l-ES-2-61, Folder: Subfolder: ES-2-6-1. NACP.
Ibid.
Federal program administrators, states, and crew leaders had to coordinate
efforts and follow specific rules for the program to succeed. 7 /1/59, Report by
the U.S. Department of Labor for James Roosevelt, RG 174, NACP. This created challenges, since crew leaders tended to pursue whatever course of action
would earn them the most money, and state officials often caved to pressures
presen~ed by their constituencies, which left federal administrators attemptmg to implement national policy at a local level with minimal support. The
result was local employers having an easier time claiming labor shortages and
demanding access to foreign labor.
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limited its success. Once again, the U.S. government placed a premium on food production and Florida growers took advantage
of their position as major food producers. During immigration
debates of the early 1950s, agricultural proponents were agaih able
to secure exemptions for workers. In 1952, the Immigration and
Nationality Act formally codified the existing Bahamian/BWI program in law. Section H-2 provided the modern legal grounding
for the importation of nonimmigrant foreign labor for seasonal
agricultural employment. 67 (For this reason, modern agricultural
guestworkers are referred to as H-2A visa holders.)
Increased agricultural demands during wartime again provided growers with opportunities to claim they needed access to
greater numbers of workers. Similar to the World War II era, many
African-American former farmworkers refused to work in the fields
for paltry wages, insisting on pay increases and threatening to look
elsewhere for work. Growers, refusing to pay the higher wages,
claimed labor shortages and demanded access to a reliable supply
of foreign labor. Their lobbying efforts were successful; guestworkers continued entering the United States. By the 1960s, however,
conditions changed both in the United States and abroad and the
Bahamian program began to decline.
The Emergence of the Modern Farm Labor System
"The 85 th Congress was a humanitarian Congress," declared
Secretary of Labor, Willard Wirtz in his statement discussing the
termination of the Mexican Bracero Program in 1964. 68 Wirtz contextualized the program's end by noting America's changing climate
due to passage of the Civil Rights and the Economic Opportunity
Acts. 69 He argued that ending the Mexican guestworker program,
67

68

69

Employers had to pay a bond for imported Bahamian/BWI workers, but it was
substantially less than the amount they would have to pay for other agricultural
workers, say from Canada, the Philippines, or Hawaii. (12/24/52, Operations
Instructions I. Bond Schedules for nonimmigrants admitted under Section
10l(a)(l5)(H) of the Immigration and Nationality Act and 8 CFR 214h.2,
RG 85 (INS), Entry 9, Subject Correspondence Files, 1906-1939, Box: 21403,
Folder: 5636/214H Pt. 1 [screened 2/2000] [Folder 3 of 3]. NAB.)
12/19/64 Statement by Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz on the Termination of Public Law No. 78, Ms 14, RG 1, Series 4: Subject Files, 1961-1984, Box
96, Folder: Labor, Costs and Regulation, 1963-1966, Chase Collection, Special and Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of
Florida (UF), Gainesville, Florida. Public Law No. 78 authorized the Bracero
Program.
The 1964 Civil Rights Act made it unlawful for employers to discriminate based
on an individual's "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Public Law
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which he characterized as "a system that had too often disregarded
human values," was central to the mission of fulfilling the American
public's demand for social, economic, and political improvements. 70
Wirtz acknowledged farmwork-and "stoop labor" in particularwas "unquestionably hard and unpleasant," but he pointed out that
lots ofjobs are 'Just as hard and just as objectionable," yet people do
them because the wages offered make it worthwhile. 71 Noting the
four million unemployed citizens in the United States, he argued
that, if workers received just wages and had decent working conditions, Americans could take these positions and growers would not
need foreign labor. The Bracero Program, however, negated this
possibility by keeping wages low and working conditions so terrible
that only foreigners would accept these agricultural jobs.
After successfully terminating the Bracero Program in 1964,
Secretary Wirtz set his sights on the Bahamian and BWI temporary
worker programs. He did not, however, state outright his desire to
end these programs. While Wirtz noted that the 15,000 workers
present in the United States under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (Public Law 414) would not be affected by any
"administrative extension" of the law ending the Bracero Program,
he did say that he would administer the program in strict accordance with the new regulations, which specified terms and conditions that must be offered to domestic workers before certifying
admission for foreign labor. 72 In the months following the Bracero
Program's termination, Wirtz focused his attention on the Bahamian/BWI programs, seeking to improve conditions for workers and
make it prohibitively expensive for growers to hire foreign labor. 73

70

71
72

73

88-452, known as the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act (sometimes referred to
as the Anti-Poverty Bill), provided funds for job training, adult education, and
small business loans in an effort to combat the root causes of unemployment
and poverty in America.
12/19/64 Statement by Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz on the Termination of Public Law No. 78, Chase Collection, Special and Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, UF. In 1951 Public Law No. 78 replaced
Public Law No. 45, the original law authorizing the Bracero Program.
Ibid.
12/ 19 / 64 Statement by Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz on the Termination of Public Law No. 78, Chase Collection, Special and Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, UF, 2. 12/19/64 Statement by Secretary
of Labor W. Willard Wirtz on the Termination of Public Law No. 78, Chase
Collection, Special and Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, UF.
Cindy Hahamovitch, '"The Worst Job in the World': Reform, Revolution, and
the Secret Rebellion in Florida's Cane Fields," Journal of Peasant Studies 35,
Issue 4 (2008) ,:772.
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The decline of the Bahamian temporary foreign labor program was the result of interconnected domestic and international
factors. First, Secretary Wirtz wanted it to end during his tenure,
which lasted from 1962 to 1969, so he put significant effort into
reducing growers' access to foreign workers by limiting the available supply of labor. Second, the Department of Labor's pressure
to end the formal foreign labor program coincided with changing
demographics in Florida resulting from an increase of Mexican
and Central American migration into the region, and these new
workers' presence decreased the need for domestic and Caribbean
workers. At the same time, conditions in the Bahamas also changed
dramatically. Tourism's resurgence, coupled with an increasing
rights consciousness at home, led to economic rejuvenation and
the foreign labor program's collapse. Taken together, these domestic and international changes set the stage for a shift in Florida and
East Coast agriculture away from domestic and Bahamian workers
towards a largely migrant, often undocumented/falsely documented Latin American workforce.
Florida agricultural producers long argued that ending foreign labor importation would undermine American food production and harm consumers financially. Nevertheless, following in
the footsteps of previous labor secretaries, Wirtz remained strong
in his conviction that it was in the best interest of American workers
to eliminate the program in most cases. By the mid-l 960s, he had
successfully prevented most growers and their associations from
importing large numbers of workers by making the program costly
and by actively recruiting domestic workers to fill open positions. 74
A 1965 memo between executives of Chase & Company in Florida illustrates the effectiveness ofWirtz's efforts. The company was
a major player in the citrus and celery industries and it often compared its labor situation between the two crops to identify impending changes. According to new regulations, employers hoping to
obtain foreign labor would have to submit individual requests (as
opposed to group requests through their association, the FFVA)
indicating the number of workers they believed they would need
to harvest their crops. Furthermore, the Citrus Industrial Council
reported that the new contracts stated employers would have to
74

As noted, Florida's sugar industry continued importing workers with little
opposition. However, by restricting foreign labor usage almost exclusively to
sugar, Secretary Wirtz succeeded in minimizing Bahamian participation in the
program since that country had essentially banned the use of Bahamian laborers in sugarcane harvesting from the beginning.
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pay "foreign workers at a rate not less than the prevailing wage rate
or the established adverse effect wage rate, whichever is higher." 75
In an attempt to circumvent the legislation's intent, the Council
suggested its members strike the latter provision from the contract
since the adverse effect wage rate had not yet been established in
Florida for the season. If they did this, growers would not be legally
bound to pay the adverse effect wage if it went into effect and it
would give an employer the opportunity to decide "whether or not
he wishes to employ supplemental foreign workers and domestic
workers at this rate." 76 If they signed the contracts without striking
the provision, they would be bound to pay it once it was established.
The labor situation was not so dire in Florida that employers
would hire offshore workers at any wage rate. Rather, growers carefully monitored labor costs in order to determine which employment option was most cost-effective. The Labor Department's
efforts to reduce foreign labor were working. By forcing employers
to pay adequate wages to foreign workers, the Department reduced
demand for guestworkers. Realizing ideal conditions for employing offshore labor were disappearing and that the more stringent
requirements applied to the Citrus Council contract were becoming the norm, the Florida Fresh Produce Exchange (a group of
celery growers to which the Chase Company belonged) decided
it would "not attempt any such contract as the Citrus Council proposed" because it felt that if "that was the best arrangement that
could be made in order to obtain foreign labor, the celery crowd
would simply drop it." 77
Growers marshaled their political strength to try and maintain fairly open and easy access to foreign labor, but the tide was
turning against them. Former Governor Spessard Holland, a longtime agricultural advocate and now a U.S. Senator for the state,
attempted to alleviate pressures on Florjda growers and increase
their power by suggesting Congress amend the 1965 Farm Bill so
that statutory responsibility for recommending approval of foreign
workers would shift from the Secretary of Labor to the Secretary of
75
76
77

2/25/64, Citrus Industrial Council Newsletter. Ms 14, RG 1, Series 4, Box 91,
Folder: Chase & Company. Citrus Department. 1964, Chase Collection, Special
and Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, UF.
Ibid.
9/28/65, Memo from R. Chase to S.O. Chase,Jr. and Frank W. Chase, Ms 14,
RG 1, Series 4, Box 91, Folder: Chase & Company. Citrus Department. 1965,
Chase Collection, Special and Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers
Libraries, UF.
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Agriculture. Vice President Hubert Humphrey's tie-breaking vote
defeated this effort. 78 Holland's proposal harkened back to earlier
efforts to wrest control of the farm labor program away from the
Department of Labor, since the department traditionally represented laborers' interests. Holland's goal was to place the program
under the direction of the Department of Agriculture, which advocated policies supporting farmers and agricultural production.
Throughout 1965, the Department of Labor continued to
push back against growers' labor shortage claims. When leading
Florida growers like the Wedgworth and Chase families petitioned
directly to the Secretary of Labor, they met with little success or
sympathy. 79 Wirtz told representatives of the two companies they
"hadn't done anything to help" themselves on the labor front, noting that they had not improved their housing or raised wages to
become competitive with other industries. 80 During this meeting
Wirtz did approve offshore workers in sugarcane, but argued it was
unnecessary in vegetables. When the delegation pointed out the
crop losses suffered over the past year because growers lacked sufficient labor to harvest it, Wirtz countered that it was not a labor
issue that ruined production, but rather poor market conditions. 81
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80
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10/14/65, FFVA Labor Bulletin, No. 246/65-66. Ms 14, RG 1, Series 4, Box 96,
Folder: Labor, Costs and Regulation, 1963-1966, Chase Collection, Special and
Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, UF.
The Wedgworth family, which was headed by Ruth S. Wedgworth in 1942,
owned and operated several farms, a packing plant, and a fertilizer plant in
Florida. Combined, these enterprises were part of the H.H. Wedgworth estate.
By 1965, Ruth's son George took over managing the family businesses. United States Congress House Select Committee Investigating National Defense
Migration, National Defense Migration Hearing Part 33 (Tolan Hearings), 77th
Congress, 2d Session, 1942 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1942); Florida Legislature, Legislative Council and Florida Legislature Legislative Reference Bureau, Migrant Labor in Florida, A Summary of Recent
Studies, Tallahassee, 1961; 10/28/65, Memo from J.C. Hutchinson to Randall
Chase, SO Chase Jr., & Lee P. Moore, Manager & Chief Executive Officer of
Chase & Company, starting August 1, 1965.
10/19/65, Memo fromJ.C. Hutchinson to Randall Chase, SO Chase Jr, & Lee
P. Moore, Ms 14, RG 1, Series 4, Box 91, Folder: Chase & Company. Citrus ·
Department. 1965, Chase Collection, Special and Area Studies Collections,
George A. Smathers Libraries, UF.
10/19/65, Memo fromJ.C. Hutchinson to Randall Chase, SO Chase Jr, & Lee
P. Moore, Ms 14, RG 1, Series 4, Box 91, Folder: Chase & Company, Citrus
Department. 1965, Chase Collection, Special and Area Studies Collections,
George A. Smathers Libraries, UF. The speaker took offense to Wirtz's implication that he was lying about the matter, and Wirtz had the exchange stricken
from the written record. However, he did not apologize or recant his assertion
that shortages were due to market rather than labor conditions.
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Wirtz continued to hold the line on foreign labor importation,
even in the face of stiff opposition. The Orlando Sentinel reported
that in December of 1964, Senator Holland was so furious that he
"vowed he would start efforts to have Wirtz impeached," claiming
Wirtz's policies would destroy the Sunshine State's citrus industry.82 However, the paper declared in December of 1965, "Wirtz out
of Doghouse, Citrus Industry Finds Enough U.S. Pickers." 83 The
Orlando Sentinel reported that in the previous season, 2,845 foreign
laborers worked in citrus but that during the current year there
were none. The paper attributed the availability of domestic labor
to increased wages, in-migration from other southern states, freewheelers who were not part of the formal recruitment program,
and local farm labor made available by flooding in other crops. 84
Building on this successful usage of domestic labor, Wirtz expanded the role of the U.S. Employment Service the following year to
recruit more domestic labor. Although the Department of Labor's
policies forced many vegetable growers to utilize domestic labor,
these alone did not facilitate the Bahamian program's closure. The
Labor Department's policies proved to be at odds with other government agencies, like the Immigration and Naturalization Service
and Border Patrol, which had long protected growers' interests in
the West by carrying out strategic immigration raids or employing
employer-friendly border patrol measures. 85 As a result of government action and changes in western agricultural production, farm
laborers from Mexico and Central America, mainly Guatemala,
gradually worked their way into the Florida labor market, and
fundamentally reshaped the labor market by the 1970s. In order
to understand the transition from black Bahamian or African
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12/28/65, ''Wirtz Out of Doghouse, Citrus Industry Finds Enough US Pickers," Orlando Sentinel, Box 79, Folder: Legislation; Labor: Migratory Farm
Labor, Current File, Charles E. Bennett Papers, Special and Area Studies Collections, George A. Smathers Libraries, UF. By 1961, Florida produced roughly
69 percent of the United States' citrus tonnage. Florida Statistical Reporting
Service, "Fourteenth Annual Citrus Statistical Summary," Florida Department
of Agriculture and Florida Citrus Commission, April 1962, 1. http:/ /www.nass.
usda.gov /Statistics_by_State/Florida/Publications/hist_sum_pdf/ citrus/ cs/
florida%20citrus%20fruit%20annual%20summary-1961.pdf
12/28/65, ''Wirtz Out of Doghouse, Citrus Industry Finds Enough US Pickers,"
Orlando Se:ntine~ Box 79, Folder: Legislation, Labor: Migratory Farm Labor,
Current File, Charles E. Bennett Papers Special and Area Studies Collections,
George A. Smathers Libraries, UF.
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American labor to Latinx, however, we need to look more closely
at national agricultural trends in the preceding two decades.
Throughout the 1950s and 60s, southern and western agricultural workers in the United States lost their land and/ or jobs due
to mechanization, bracero guestworkers, and undocumented farm
laborers. Historian Kitty Calavita noted that "mechanization continued at a rapid pace, reducing the total number of farm workers
by an unprecedented 41 percent between 1950 and 1960, while
agricultural output expanded." 86 She also found "the average number [of braceros] entering annually between 1951 and 1959 was ten
times higher than the number admitted during the wartime program of 1942-1947, when a labor emergency had been declared." 87
During this same period, the number of undocumented immigrants entering the United States also increased.
Undocumented Mexican workers excluded from the formal
Bracero Program exploited immigration enforcement loopholes
and growers' desires for labor. As Calavita argues, "illegal immigration was not simply a byproduct of the Bracero Program, but
was encouraged by INS enforcement policies."88 Along the border, growers exerted pressure on officials to allow unmitigated
migration since it supported their business needs. Many Mexicans
migrated to the United States illegally and, with the blessings of
the INS and the Border Patrol, "touched back" over the border,
and then reentered immediately as newly certified bracero workers. INS proposed this plan in response to complaints by growers
that the official process was too expensive and time-consuming. 89
The new touch back practice was in direct conflict with the
intent of official labor recruitment strategies and regulations promoted by the Department of Labor, but it enabled struggling government agencies like the INS and the Border Patrol to cope with
increasing illegal immigration. 90 The practice, however, came at a
cost. Over time, the number of undocumented workers outpaced
that of legal workers since employers could hire the former for
86
87
88

89
90

Calavita, Inside the State, 71.
Ibid., 141.
Ibid.,33. Border Patrol formed in 1924 in response to the National Origins Act
because government officials knew migrants would seek alternative entrance
routes when formal paths were closed to them. Hernandez, Migra! A History of
the U.S. Border Patro~ 32.
Calavita, Inside the State, 2-3.
Calavita notes that "By 1950, the number of Mexicans 'legalized' and 'paroled'
to growers as braceros was five times higher than the number actually recruited from Mexico." Calavita, Inside the State, 2.
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less money and with little fear of penalty. Even during Operation
Wetback, a controversial U.S. government attempt to reduce the
number of illegal immigrants in the country in 1954, INS officials
coordinated with employers of undocumented workers along the
Mexico/U.S. border by letting employers know when they were
planning to deport their workers, and making sure new legal workers were immediately available if necessary. Border Patrol proved
notoriously reluctant to deport illegal farmworkers during the
harvest season. 91 Growers' ability to shape labor policy and practices at all levels-from the perpetuation of the Bracero Program
at the federal level to undermining local enforcement of federal
immigration policy-highlights their power in creating a new labor
system that favored their interests alone. As a result, braceros,
undocumented workers, and mechanization forced legal foreign
and domestic workers out of the job market starting in the l 950s. 92
Responding to changing labor conditions, immigration policies and anti-Mexican attitudes in the Southwest, Latinx families
began moving to places like Florida in the 1950s, but their numbers remained small until the 1980s. In their study on the Latinization of the Florida workforce, Leo C. Polopolus and Robert D.
Emerson found that in 1971, over 50 percent of all hired workers were African American, and only 6.4 percent were Mexican. 93
By the late 1980s, researchers found the reported percentage of
African Americans in the horticulture workforce dropped precipitously, making up less than 15 percent. In contrast, Mexican participation increased and now made up almost two-thirds of the total
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Ibid., 53.
David Griffith, American Guestworkers: Jamaicans and Mexicans in the U.S. Labor
Market (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006), 186.
Although the Cuban Revolution took place in 1959, relatively few Cubans
entered the agricultural workforce given their preferential treatment as immigrants fleeing communism during the Cold War. For more details see Melanie
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(August 1985): 498.
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Labor Market (Gainesville: Food and Resource Economics Dept., Institute
of Food and Agricultural Sciences, University of Florida, 1994), 1-2. Of the
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horticultural workforce. 94 Although the estimates were based on
horticulture, and not food crops exclusively, researchers concluded the trends fairly represented the Florida seasonal farm labor
markets. 95
The domestic legislation and international events increased
the flow of migratory labor in the 1980s and 1990s. The 1986 Immigration and Reform Control Act (IRCA) and North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA, passed in 1993) solidified Florida's reliance on a farm labor workforce made up of Mexicans, Mexican
Americans, and Guatemalans. 96 Additionally, since large numbers
of the newly naturalized citizens under IRCA were male heads of
household, upon receiving legal status they began the process of
reunifying their families by bringing them to the United States.
This resulted in new legal and illegal migratory flows. 97 Larger
numbers of Guatemalans also began crossing the border in the
1980s, with and without proper documentation, as they were fleeing a violent civil war at home. Many moved to Florida where they
joined the agricultural labor force. 98 By the 1990-1991 harvest season, Guatemalans made up 20 percent of the work force, and Mexicans/Chicanos made up an additional 49 percent. The remaining
30 percent of workers were split almost evenly between Haitianborn and African American workers. 99
Most scholars also agree NAFTA had a devastating effect on
wages in Mexico. Rather than reducing the wage gap, it increased
it. Small subsistence farmers could not compete with imported
foodstuffs from the United States. As a result, NAFTA pushed
many Mexicans north to look for work in the United States. 100 As
94
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Published by STARS, 2022

29

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 96 [2022], No. 4, Art. 3

464

FLORIDA HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

labor conditions began changing in the states just over the border,
Mexican and Mexican American workers in those areas looked for
opportunities in states further away. Florida, with its strong agricultural economy and position as an entry point to East Coast labor
migration streams, became a destination for migrant workers.
Whereas employers considered the Latinx workers of the 1950s
and 1960s merely supplemental workers filling short-term vacancies, over time, they came to recognize them as an invaluable, and
preferred, source of inexpensive and exploitable labor. Indigenous
people from Mexico and Guatemala, who did not speak English
or Spanish fluently, often suffered the worst abuse. 101 Haitians also
joined the Florida agricultural labor force in larger numbers starting in the 1980s when dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier lost power. 102
Some put the current estimates of Haitian workers at about 35 percent of Florida's 400,000 farmworkers. 103
At the same time the Department of Labor was restricting
legal labor importation and Florida was undergoing demographic
shifts, the Bahamas underwent significant changes that would lead
to the temporary labor program's demise. 104 Tourism rebounded
and with it the Bahamas saw increased job opportunities in construction industries and service sector jobs. 105 This economic boom
undermined the foreign labor program's previous appeal. 106 In the
101 The Coalition oflmmokalee workers is best known for its worker-led efforts to
improve agricultural worker wages and prosecute cases of modem-day slavery.
Visit their website for more information. http://ciw-online.org/ slavery/.
102 Many Haitians migrated to the United States following the devastating earthquake in 2010. They, and some of their predecessors, were granted Temporary
Protective Status, which allowed them to work and not be deported. It was set
to expire in 2018, but was extended through January 2019.
103 Voice of America, "It's a 'Hard Knock' Life for Haitian Farm Workers in
Miami," April 21, 2010. https:/ /www.voanews.com/a/its-a-hard-knock-life-forhaitian-farm-workers-in-miami-91877569 / 16390 I .html.
104 Klaus de Albuquerque and Jerome L. McElroy. "Bahamian Labor Migration,
1901-1963," New West Indian Guide/ Nieuwe West-lndische Gids60, no. 3/4 Leiden
(1986), 172. Bahamian scholars and political leaders, like Gail Saunders and
Sir Clifford Darling, both noted that starting in the late 1950s, Bahamians
developed a stronger race and labor consciousness. Gail Saunders, "The 'Race
Card' and the Rise to Power of the Progressive Liberal Party in the Bahamas,"
The journal of Caribbean History 41, no. 1/2. Qanuary 1, 2007), 1-2, 60; Sir Clifford Darling, A Bahamian Life Story. Vol. 1: The Years of Strugg/,e, 1922-58. (selfpub., Creative Edge), 62.
105 The unemployment rate in New Providence declined to four percent, and was
only about six percent in the Family Islands. Kramer The Q-Ff"shores 16 RG 174
NACP.
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'
106 In the 1963 Annual Report, the Bahamas Ministry of Labor addressed reasons
for the program's decline. Kramer, The Offshores, 16, RG 174, NACP.
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waning years of the program, most participants were older Bahamians who had worked contracts in the temporary foreign labor
program multiple times. An improved Bahamian economy negated the need for them to travel long distances to do arduous labor.
Furthermore, the Bahamas Ministry of Labor noted that young
men were either too inexperienced to "establish a solid niche in
the foreign labor program or to cope with its conditions." 107 The
ministry argued fewer young men grew up working in the fields,
makingjobs in the local construction industry more appealing. He
also pointed out that with the boom, domestic wages increased to
the point that they were competitive with, if not better than, wages
offered in the guestworker program. In addition to a diminishing
demand for migratory work among Bahamian men, the government also found the program economically unsustainable. From
approximately 1962 onwards, growers had shifted the burden of
paying for the program to the Bahamian government, which was
essentially subsidizing the program. 108
Conclusion

Throughout the twentieth century, Florida growers adeptly
wielded their newfound political power to craft the emerging agricultural labor system in their favor. When faced with ideological
challenges, like immigration restriction or border enforcement,
growers highlighted the economic risk these new measures could
cause the state. State politicians responded by supporting measures
designed to mitigate the most stringent measures, resulting in
decades oflabor policy that favored employers over workers. Growers pushed state and federal officials to pass legislation that made it
easy for employers to shift from forced convict and peon laborers,
to impoverished domestic and non-citizen laborers. As domestic
workers took advantage of better job opportunities outside agriculture, growers turned to foreign workers as the solution to maintaining a largely dependent and exploitable work force. This first
took shape as the temporary guestworker program, which eventually morphed into a reliance on largely falsely /undocumented
workers.
As African Americans left the agricultural labor market, and
the formal Mexican and Bahamian guestworker programs became
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid.
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more expensive and restrictive, growers turned to the larger number of falsely/undocumented, temporary, foreign migrants from
Mexico and Central America. The H-2A guestworker program still
exists today, but the number workers employed through this program are significantly lower in number compared to those who are
falsely /undocumented. 109 As Kelly Lytle Hernandez has argued,
along the U.S./Mexico border, "racialized notions of citizenship,"
and the immigration policies designed to support these ideas, have
been used to determine who can and cannot join the American
publicY 0 Describing detained individuals "as 'Mexican' regardless
of their formal citizenship status while seamlessly interchanging
the terms of white and American" reveals how people of Mexican
descent were marginalized and deemed "temporary outsiders within the region's dominant social, cultural, political and economic
systems."m Employers along the border could utilize their labor
while simultaneously supporting policies that excluded them from
participating fully in American life.
In a similar fashion, growers in Florida made sure Bahamian
workers were seen as" temporary outsiders." They imported thousands of workers and whisked them away to the state's interior. Few
Floridians, and even fewer tourists, ever witnessed their presence.
When they were seen, they were often identified simply as "black"
workers, particularly in the Jim Crow South. Growers quickly realized that Bahamians' marginalized status as black men in America,
coupled with their inability to become citizens, made them the perfect workforce; a workforce that lacked the political or social capital
necessary to push for better conditions. Recognizing Americans'
general desire for cheap food an9 disinterest in engaging the difficult issues of race, labor, and migration, Florida growers throughout the twentieth actively crafted a new narrative about farm labor
in the American public's imagination. By casting agricultural work
as so difficult, low paying, and generally undesirable that no American would accept the job, growers shaped Americans' ideas about
the nature of farm work, and the people willing to do it-people
who were impoverished, nonwhite, and noncitizens. 112
109
110
111
112
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The shift to mainly falsely/undocumented workers at the
turn of the twenty-first century means growers in Florida and
throughout the United States perpetuate a labor system based on
the exploitation of low-wage workers on the margins of society.
Under this new system, however, agricultural workers have even
fewer means to legal recourse when their labor rights are violated than did their predecessors. As non-citizens, guestworkers and
falsely /undocumented workers often feel they cannot adequately
challenge unfair wages and working conditions because they risk
deportation if they cause "trouble," and most Americans are not
overly concerned about their plight. 113 A close examination of the
Bahamian guestworker program reveals how growers in states like
Florida successfully created a system in which farmworkers exist
outside the parameters of citizenship and the benefits associated
with it.

113 Hahamovitch, No Man's Land, 165,200.
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